Conflict Trajectory Assessment
How a conflict evolves — from force-based revisionism to post-war containment.
Russia’s War Against Ukraine and the Transition to Post-War Containment
Conflict Trajectory Assessment
This demonstration product shows how TESPA analyses a conflict not merely as an ongoing military confrontation, but as a trajectory of changing strategic behaviour, systemic consequences and a possible future architecture of containment.
The product traces the evolution of Russian strategy: from an attempt to impose new rules by force through the war against Ukraine towards a defensive-destructive model of status preservation through destabilisation, blocking, escalation bargaining and coercion into recognising the “new realities”.
Ukraine is examined as the central node through which the international system tests whether the forcible change of borders can be legitimised. The product also outlines a possible transition by the United States and the West from wartime coercion of the Russian Federation to long-term post-war containment and managed competition.
Russia’s War Against Ukraine and the Transition to Post-War Containment
Product type: Conflict Trajectory Assessment
Methodological basis: TESPA / SPA
Format: demonstration analytical product
Focus: Russian strategy, Ukraine as a systemic node, coercion, containment, post-war managed competition
Executive Summary
Russia’s war against Ukraine is not merely a bilateral or regional conflict. In TESPA logic, it is a systemic test for the international order: whether a great power can change borders by force, impose limits on the sovereign choice of its neighbours and force the international system to recognise the results of violence as a new political reality.
Russia’s initial strategy consisted in using the war against Ukraine as an instrument for the forcible revision of the post-Cold War hierarchy. Moscow sought to present the war not as aggression against Ukraine, but as a global confrontation with the West. In this logic, a potential Russian victory was intended to mean not only a change in the situation in Ukraine, but also a demonstration of the inability of the United States, the EU and NATO to defend the basic rules of the international order.
However, this strategy did not produce the result Russia expected. Instead of rapid coercion of Ukraine and the West, it led to prolonged military, sanctions-related, economic, diplomatic and status exhaustion. As a result, Russian strategy is increasingly being transformed: from an offensive attempt to impose “multipolarity” on its own terms towards a defensive-destructive model of status preservation through destabilisation, blocking, the threat of escalation, crisis bargaining and coercion into recognising the “new realities”.
Ukraine, within this trajectory, is not a passive object of arrangements between great powers. It is the central node through which the capacity of the international system to block the legitimisation of the forcible change of borders is being tested. This is why the future of the war against Ukraine will determine not only Ukrainian security, but also the broader architecture of international competition.
1. Analytical Purpose
The purpose of this product is to show the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine as a process of change in Russian strategic logic and in the response of the international system.
This product does not describe the war merely as a sequence of military events. It analyses how the objectives, instruments, functions and systemic consequences of Russian strategy have changed.
The key analytical questions are:
- What was the initial strategic logic of the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine?
- Why did the war against Ukraine become an instrument of systemic coercion for Russia?
- How did Russian strategy transform after the failure of rapid coercion?
- What role does Ukraine play as a node of the international system?
- How may the United States and the West move from wartime coercion of the Russian Federation to post-war containment and managed competition?
2. Initial Russian Strategy
Russia’s initial strategy was aimed not only at controlling Ukraine. Its broader objective was to coerce the international system into recognising new rules.
In this logic, the war against Ukraine was intended to perform several functions.
The first function was territorial-political. Russia sought to limit Ukraine’s sovereignty, force it to abandon an independent security choice and secure for itself the right to influence Ukraine’s future status.
The second function was status-related. Moscow sought to demonstrate that Russia remained a great power capable of changing rules by force and forcing the West to negotiate while taking Russian demands into account.
The third function was systemic. The war was intended to prove that the previous unipolar hierarchy no longer worked and that Russia was capable of imposing its own version of “multipolarity”.
The fourth function was demonstrative. Russia sought to show other actors that the forcible revision of the status quo could be an effective instrument for changing international rules.
3. Ukraine as a Systemic Node
Ukraine became the central node of this strategy because it is through the Ukrainian case that a basic rule of the international system is being tested: borders cannot be changed by force.
If the forcible change of borders is legitimised, this will create a precedent not only for Europe, but also for other regional crises. Such an outcome would mean that war can be used as an effective instrument for revising the international order.
If, however, this precedent is blocked, the international system will preserve the basic rule of the inadmissibility of the forcible revision of the status quo. This is why the Ukrainian case matters not only for Ukraine, but for the entire international architecture.
In TESPA logic, Ukraine is not simply the territory of a conflict, but a node through which several systemic questions pass:
whether a great power may have a veto over the security choice of a neighbour;
whether spheres of influence can be restored by force;
whether the United States, the EU and NATO can preserve consolidation;
whether the international system can stop revisionism;
whether the Ukrainian case will become a precedent for other conflicts.
4. Failure of Rapid Coercion
Russian strategy rested on the assumption that Ukraine, the West or the international system would be forced quickly to accept the new reality. This did not happen.
Ukraine preserved political and military resilience. The West did not recognise Russian demands as the basis of a new order. Sanctions pressure gradually limited the capabilities of the Russian Federation. NATO and the EU, rather than weakening, began to adapt to the new security reality.
This does not mean that Russian strategy disappeared completely. It changed form. After the failure of rapid coercion, Russia increasingly began to use a model of prolonged pressure: the exhaustion of Ukraine, information campaigns, nuclear rhetoric, threats of escalation, attempts to divide the West, work with countries of the Global South and crisis bargaining.
5. Evolution of Russian Strategy
The evolution of Russian strategy can be described as a transition from offensive systemic ambition to defensive-destructive adaptation.
At the first stage, Russia tried to impose “multipolarity” on the world on its own terms. The war against Ukraine was an instrument of force-based coercion.
At the second stage, Russia encountered Ukrainian resistance, sanctions, Western consolidation and the narrowing of its own strategic space.
At the third stage, its behaviour increasingly acquired a destructive character. Instead of creating an attractive alternative model of international order, Russia began to act through blocking, destabilisation, the threat of escalation and crisis bargaining.
At the fourth stage, Russian strategy may move into an attempt to preserve status through negotiations over the “new realities”, partial sanctions relief, strategic stability, energy, the Arctic or other tracks that Moscow may use to return to great-power status.
6. Western Response
The response of the United States and the West is formed as a combination of coercion, support for Ukraine, sanctions, military containment and the gradual creation of a long-term security architecture.
The United States performs the role of systemic coordinator. It supports Ukraine, maintains sanctions pressure, coordinates allies and prevents the legitimisation of the forcible revision of borders.
The EU is gradually taking on more regional functions: financing, sanctions, defence-industrial mobilisation, support for Ukraine, security guarantees and recovery.
NATO remains the main military-political framework for containing the Russian Federation. Through NATO, the adaptation of the security architecture, the strengthening of the eastern flank, defence planning and long-term containment are coordinated.
Ukraine remains the operational centre of this system. Through the Ukrainian theatre, the effectiveness of military assistance, sanctions, coalition formats and future security guarantees is being tested.
7. Conflict Trajectory
The trajectory of the conflict can be presented as a sequence of several phases:
Phase 1: Force-based coercion.
The Russian Federation attempts rapidly to change Ukraine’s status and coerce the international system into recognising new rules.
Phase 2: Resistance and blocking of the precedent.
Ukraine resists, the West consolidates, and the legitimisation of the forcible change of borders is blocked.
Phase 3: Prolonged exhaustion.
The Russian Federation shifts to long-term pressure, destabilisation, information influence, nuclear rhetoric and crisis bargaining.
Phase 4: Coercion towards ending the war.
The United States and the West seek to create conditions under which the Russian Federation will be forced to accept a framework for ending the war that does not legitimise the forcible revision of borders.
Phase 5: Post-war containment.
After the active phase of the war, the Russian Federation may be transferred into a regime of long-term managed competition: sanctions, security guarantees, military containment, risk control and limited channels of interaction.
8. TESPA Interpretation
In TESPA logic, this conflict is not only a war between two states. It is a trajectory of systemic testing.
The initial Russian signal is the use of force to change the status quo.
The pattern is an attempt at the force-based contestation of the unipolar hierarchy.
The scenario is either the legitimisation of the “new realities” or the blocking of a force-based precedent.
The architectural consequence is the formation of a new system of containment of the Russian Federation around Ukraine, Europe, NATO and the United States.
This case shows how a war can move from the level of a regional conflict to the level of systemic competition over the rules of the international order.
9. Key Indicators to Monitor
For further analysis of the conflict trajectory, it is important to monitor the following indicators:
changes in Russian rhetoric concerning the “new realities”;
signals of Russia’s readiness or unwillingness to negotiate;
attempts to link Ukraine to broader bargaining tracks — sanctions, strategic stability, energy or the Arctic;
changes in military assistance to Ukraine;
the level of Western consolidation;
the development of European security guarantees;
changes in the positions of China, Iran and countries of the Global South;
the emergence of new formats of post-war containment of the Russian Federation.
10. Strategic Assessment
The main strategic assessment is that Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed not only regional security, but also the architecture of international competition.
Russia sought to use the war as an instrument for the forcible revision of rules. Ukraine became the node that blocked the rapid legitimisation of this revision. The United States and the West began to form a long-term system of containment. Europe gradually moved towards a more active security role. NATO strengthened its function as an institutional coordinator.
The post-war stage, if it arrives, will not mean the end of systemic confrontation. It will mean a change in its form: from a direct military phase to managed competition, in which the Russian Federation will remain a source of risk, but its behaviour must be limited by new rules, sanctions, security guarantees and mechanisms of containment.
Final Assessment
Russia’s war against Ukraine is one of the central conflicts of the contemporary international system because it concerns not only territory, but rules. If the result of violence is legitimised, this will weaken the basic norm of the inadmissibility of the forcible change of borders. If such a precedent is blocked, the international system will have a chance to renew itself without the normalisation of revisionism.
In this sense, Ukraine is not a peripheral, but a systemic actor. It is not only defending its own statehood, but also taking part in determining what the rules of international competition will be in the next period.
Russia’s War Against Ukraine and the Transition to Post-War Containment
Format: short conflict trajectory assessment for decision-oriented analytical reading
Focus: Russia, Ukraine, the United States, the EU, NATO, sanctions, coercion and post-war containment
Methodological basis: TESPA / SPA
Executive Summary
Russia’s war against Ukraine is not merely a regional conflict. It is a systemic test for the international order: whether a great power can change borders by force, limit the sovereign choice of its neighbours and force the international system to recognise the result of violence as a new political reality.
Russia’s initial strategy was aimed at the rapid coercion of Ukraine and the broader revision of the post-Cold War hierarchy. Moscow sought to present the war as a global confrontation with the West, in which a potential Russian victory would mean not only a change in the situation in Ukraine, but also the defeat of the Western system of containment.
However, rapid coercion did not produce the expected result. Ukraine preserved resilience, the West consolidated, sanctions limited Russia’s capabilities, and NATO and the EU adapted to the new security reality. As a result, Russian strategy is increasingly shifting from an offensive attempt to impose “multipolarity” towards a defensive-destructive model: destabilisation, blocking, the threat of escalation, information pressure and crisis bargaining.
Current Trajectory
The current trajectory of the conflict shows a transition from a phase of direct force-based coercion to a phase of prolonged pressure and preparation for future bargaining.
Russia is trying to preserve the ability to present the results of the war as “new realities” that must be taken into account in any future settlement. Ukraine and the West, by contrast, are trying to prevent the consequences of aggression from being legitimised as a new rule.
Thus, the main line of the conflict runs not only along the front line, but around the question of legitimacy: whether the forcible change of borders will become an acceptable way of revising the international order.
Key Phases of the Conflict
Phase 1. Force-based coercion.
The Russian Federation attempts rapidly to change Ukraine’s status, limit its sovereign choice and force the West to accept a new security framework.
Phase 2. Resistance and blocking of the precedent.
Ukraine preserves resilience, the West consolidates, and the legitimisation of the forcible change of borders is blocked.
Phase 3. Prolonged exhaustion.
The Russian Federation shifts to long-term pressure: military exhaustion, information campaigns, nuclear rhetoric, attempts to divide the West and crisis bargaining.
Phase 4. Coercion towards ending the war.
The United States and the West may increase pressure in order to force the Russian Federation to accept a framework for ending the war that does not legitimise the forcible revision of borders.
Phase 5. Post-war containment.
After the active phase of the war, the Russian Federation may be transferred into a regime of long-term managed competition: sanctions, security guarantees for Ukraine, military containment, risk control and limited channels of interaction.
Actor Behaviour
Russia seeks to preserve or restore status through crisis pressure. Its strategy increasingly relies not on creating an alternative order, but on destabilisation, blocking and coercion into recognising the “new realities”.
Ukraine acts as the central node of containment. Its resilience prevents Russia from rapidly legitimising the forcible revision of borders.
The United States performs the role of systemic coordinator. Its objective is to support Ukraine, prevent the legitimisation of Russian aggression and create the conditions for future containment of the Russian Federation.
The EU is gradually taking on more regional functions: financing, sanctions, defence-industrial mobilisation, security guarantees and Ukraine’s recovery.
NATO remains the main military-political framework for containing the Russian Federation and for the long-term adaptation of the Western security architecture.
Scenario Watch
Most supported scenario:
Controlled post-war containment
This scenario assumes that after the active phase of the war, the Russian Federation does not return to normalised relations with the West, but is transferred into a regime of limited managed competition. Cooperation is possible only in selected controlled areas, while Russia’s strategic behaviour is contained through sanctions, security guarantees, NATO, the EU and support for Ukraine.
Secondary scenario:
Fragmented settlement and prolonged instability
In this scenario, the war may be partially frozen or reduced in intensity, but without a stable architecture of guarantees. The Russian Federation preserves the ability to use uncertainty as an instrument of pressure.
Risk scenario:
Legitimisation of force-based revision
This scenario emerges if the results of aggression are effectively accepted as the basis of a new order. Its consequences would extend far beyond Ukraine and could create a dangerous precedent for other regions.
Strategic Risks
The first risk is gradual Western fatigue and reduced support for Ukraine.
The second risk is Russia’s attempt to impose negotiations on the basis of the “new realities”.
The third risk is the fragmentation of the Western position between the United States, the EU and individual European states.
The fourth risk is Russia’s use of other bargaining tracks: energy, the Arctic, strategic stability, sanctions, and relations with China or Iran.
The fifth risk is the absence of a sufficiently strong post-war system of security guarantees for Ukraine.
Monitoring Indicators
In the next cycles, it will be important to monitor:
whether Russian rhetoric concerning the “new realities” changes;
whether there are signals of Russia’s readiness to negotiate without legitimising the forcible revision of borders;
whether the level of military and financial support for Ukraine is maintained;
whether the European defence-industrial base is strengthening;
whether real security guarantees for Ukraine are being formed;
whether Russia is trying to link the Ukrainian track with sanctions, strategic stability, the Arctic or energy;
whether NATO remains the main institutional coordinator of containment of the Russian Federation.
Strategic Assessment
Russia’s war against Ukraine has already changed the architecture of international competition. It has accelerated Western security adaptation, strengthened NATO’s role, forced Europe to develop defence capacity and made Ukraine the central node of systemic containment of the Russian Federation.
The post-war stage will not mean the end of competition. On the contrary, it may become a transition to a new form of conflict: less military, but more systemic. The Russian Federation will remain a source of risk, but its behaviour may be limited through sanctions, the balance of power, security guarantees, institutional mechanisms and the control of strategic risks.
Final Assessment
The main question of Russia’s war against Ukraine is not only when and how the active phase of hostilities will end. The main question is whether the result of force-based pressure will be recognised as a political norm.
If such a precedent is blocked, the international system will preserve the basic rule of the inadmissibility of the forcible change of borders. If it is legitimised, this will create the risk of a broader normalisation of revisionism.
This is why Ukraine is not a peripheral, but a systemic actor. It is not only defending its own statehood, but also defining the boundary of what is permissible in future international competition.